Cryptographic Data Integrity Algorithms

Chapter 4/Part 3

Digital Signatures

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4.3. Objectives

• Key points.
• Generic Model of Digital Signature Process.
• Essential Elements of Digital Signature Process.
• Attacks on Digital Signatures.
• ELGAMAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME.
• SCHNORR DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME.
• DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD
• DIGITAL SIGNATURE Algorithm.
• DSS Signing and Verifying.
4.3.1 Key Points

- A digital signature is an authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a message to attach a code that acts as a signature. Typically the signature is formed by taking the hash of the message and encrypting the message with the creator’s private key. The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.

- The digital signature standard (DSS) is an NIST standard that uses the secure hash algorithm (SHA).

- The most important development from the work on public-key cryptography is the digital signature. The digital signature provides a set of security capabilities that would be difficult to implement in any other way.
4.3.2 Generic Model of Digital Signature Process
4.3.3 Essential Elements of Digital Signature Process
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In situations where there is not complete trust between sender and receiver, something more than authentication is needed. The most attractive solution to this problem is the digital signature. The digital signature must have the following properties:

- It must verify the author and the date and time of the signature.
- It must authenticate the contents at the time of the signature.
- It must be verifiable by third parties, to resolve disputes.

Thus, the digital signature function includes the authentication function.
4.3.5 Attacks on Digital Signatures

- **Key-only attack:** C only knows A’s public key.
- **Known message attack:** C is given access to a set of messages and their signatures.
- **Generic chosen message attack:** C chooses a list of messages before attempting to breaks A’s signature scheme, independent of A’s public key. C then obtains from A valid signatures for the chosen messages. The attack is generic, because it does not depend on A’s public key; the same attack is used against everyone.
- **Directed chosen message attack:** Similar to the generic attack, except that the list of messages to be signed is chosen after C knows A’s public key but before any signatures are seen.
- **Adaptive chosen message attack:** C is allowed to use A as an “oracle.” This means the A may request signatures of messages that depend on previously obtained message–signature pairs.
- **Total break:** C determines A’s private key.
- **Universal forgery:** C finds an efficient signing algorithm that provides an equivalent way of constructing signatures on arbitrary messages.
- **Selective forgery:** C forges a signature for a particular message chosen by C.
- **Existential forgery:** C forges a signature for at least one message. C has no control over the message. Consequently, this forgery may only be a minor nuisance to A.
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4.3.6 Digital Signature Requirements

- The signature must be a bit pattern that depends on the message being signed.
- The signature must use some information unique to the sender to prevent both forgery and denial.
- It must be relatively easy to produce the digital signature.
- It must be relatively easy to recognize and verify the digital signature.
- It must be computationally infeasible to forge a digital signature, either by constructing a new message for an existing digital signature or by constructing a fraudulent digital signature for a given message.
- It must be practical to retain a copy of the digital signature in storage.
4.3.8 ELGAMAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

As with ElGamal encryption, the global elements of ElGamal digital signature are a prime number $q$ and $\alpha$, which is a primitive root of $q$. User A generates a private/public key pair as follows.

1. Generate a random integer $X_A$, such that $1 < X_A < q - 1$.
2. Compute $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q$.
3. A’s private key is $X_A$; A’s public key is $\{q, \alpha, Y_A\}$.

To sign a message $M$, user A first computes the hash $m = H(M)$, such that $m$ is an integer in the range $0 \leq m \leq q - 1$. A then forms a digital signature as follows.

1. Choose a random integer $K$ such that $1 \leq K \leq q - 1$ and $\gcd(K, q - 1) = 1$. That is, $K$ is relatively prime to $q - 1$.
2. Compute $S_1 = \alpha^K \mod q$. Note that this is the same as the computation of $C_1$ for ElGamal encryption.
3. Compute $K^{-1} \mod (q - 1)$. That is, compute the inverse of $K$ modulo $q - 1$.
4. Compute $S_2 = K^{-1}(m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1)$.
5. The signature consists of the pair $(S_1, S_2)$. 
The signature is valid if $V_1 = V_2$. Let us demonstrate that this is so. Assume that the equality is true. Then we have

$$\alpha^m \mod q = (Y_A)^{S_1}(S_1)^{S_2} \mod q$$

assume $V_1 = V_2$

$$\alpha^m \mod q = \alpha^{X_A S_1} \alpha^{K S_2} \mod q$$

substituting for $Y_A$ and $S_1$

$$\alpha^{m - X_A S_1} \mod q = \alpha^{K S_2} \mod q$$

rearranging terms

$$m - X_A S_1 = K S_2 \mod (q - 1)$$

property of primitive roots

$$m - X_A S_1 = K K^{-1} (m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1)$$

substituting for $S_2$

For example, let us start with the prime field GF(19); that is, $q = 19$. It has primitive roots $\{2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15\}$, as shown in Table 8.3. We choose $\alpha = 10$.

Alice generates a key pair as follows:

1. Alice chooses $X_A = 16$.
2. Then $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q = \alpha^{16} \mod 19 = 4$.
3. Alice’s private key is 16; Alice’s public key is $\{q, \alpha, Y_A\} = \{19, 10, 4\}$.
4.3.8 ELGAMAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

Suppose Alice wants to sign a message with hash value \( m = 14 \).

1. Alice chooses \( K = 5 \), which is relatively prime to \( q - 1 = 18 \).
2. \( S_1 = \alpha^K \mod q = 10^5 \mod 19 = 3 \).
3. \( K^{-1} \mod (q - 1) = 5^{-1} \mod 18 = 11 \).
4. \( S_2 = K^{-1} (m - X_A S_1) \mod (q - 1) = 11 (14 - (16)(3)) \mod 18 = -374 \mod 18 = 4 \).

Bob can verify the signature as follows.

1. \( V_1 = \alpha^m \mod q = 10^{14} \mod 19 = 16 \).
2. \( V_2 = (Y_A)^{S_1} (S_1)^{S_2} \mod q = (4^3)(3^4) \mod 19 = 5184 \mod 19 = 16 \).

Thus, the signature is valid.
4.3.9 SCHNORR DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME

As with the ElGamal digital signature scheme, the Schnorr signature scheme is based on discrete logarithms. The Schnorr scheme minimizes the message-dependent amount of computation required to generate a signature. The main work for signature generation does not depend on the message and can be done during the idle time of the processor. The message-dependent part of the signature generation requires multiplying a $2n$-bit integer with an $n$-bit integer.

The scheme is based on using a prime modulus $p$, with $p - 1$ having a prime factor $q$ of appropriate size; that is, $p - 1 \equiv (\text{mod } q)$. Typically, we use $p \approx 2^{1024}$ and $q \approx 2^{160}$. Thus, $p$ is a 1024-bit number, and $q$ is a 160-bit number, which is also the length of the SHA-1 hash value.

The first part of this scheme is the generation of a private/public key pair, which consists of the following steps:

1. Choose primes $p$ and $q$, such that $q$ is a prime factor of $p - 1$.
2. Choose an integer $a$, such that $\alpha^q = 1 \mod p$. The values $a$, $p$, and $q$ comprise a global public key that can be common to a group of users.
3. Choose a random integer $s$ with $0 < s < q$. This is the user’s private key.
4. Calculate $v = a^{-s} \mod p$. This is the user’s public key.
A user with private key $s$ and public key $v$ generates a signature as follows.

1. Choose a random integer $r$ with $0 < r < q$ and compute $x = a^r \mod p$. This computation is a preprocessing stage independent of the message $M$ to be signed.
2. Concatenate the message with $x$ and hash the result to compute the value $e$:

$$ e = H(M \parallel x) $$

3. Compute $y = (r + se) \mod q$. The signature consists of the pair $(e, y)$.

Any other user can verify the signature as follows.

1. Compute $x' = a^y v^e \mod p$.
2. Verify that $e = H(M \parallel x')$.

To see that the verification works, observe that

$$ x' = a^y v^e = a^y a^{-se} = a^{y-se} = a^r = x \pmod{p} $$

Hence, $H(M \parallel x') = H(M \parallel x)$. 

4.3.10 DIGITAL SIGNATURE STANDARD

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186, known as the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The DSS makes use of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) described in Chapter 12 and presents a new digital signature technique, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The DSS was originally proposed in 1991 and revised in 1993 in response to public feedback concerning the security of the scheme. There was a further minor revision in 1996. In 2000, an expanded version of the standard was issued as FIPS 186-2, subsequently updated to FIPS 186-3 in 2009. This latest version also incorporates digital signature algorithms based on RSA and on elliptic curve cryptography.

(a) RSA approach

(b) DSS approach
### 4.3.11 The Digital Signature Algorithm

**Global Public-Key Components**

- $p$ prime number where $2^{L-1} < p < 2^L$
  - for $512 \leq L \leq 1024$ and $L$ a multiple of 64;
  - i.e., bit length of between 512 and 1024 bits in increments of 64 bits
- $q$ prime divisor of $(p - 1)$, where $2^{159} < q < 2^{160}$;
  - i.e., bit length of 160 bits
- $g = h^{(p-1)/q} \mod p$
  - where $h$ is any integer with $1 < h < (p - 1)$
  - such that $h^{(p-1)/q} \mod p > 1$

**User’s Private Key**

- $x$ random or pseudorandom integer with $0 < x < q$

**User’s Public Key**

- $y = g^x \mod p$

**User’s Per-Message Secret Number**

- $k$ random or pseudorandom integer with $0 < k < q$

**Signing**

- $r = (g^k \mod p) \mod q$
- $s = [k^{-1} (H(M) + xr)] \mod q$
- Signature $= (r, s)$

**Verifying**

- $w = (s')^{-1} \mod q$
- $u_1 = [H(M')w] \mod q$
- $u_2 = (r')w \mod q$
- $v = [(g^{u_1} y^{u_2}) \mod p] \mod q$
- TEST: $v = r'$

- $M$ = message to be signed
- $H(M)$ = hash of $M$ using SHA-1
- $M', r', s'$ = received versions of $M$, $r$, $s$
4.3.12 DSS Signing and Verifying

\[
s = f_1(H(M), k, x, r, q) = (k^{-1}(H(M) + xr)) \mod q
\]
\[
r = f_2(k, p, q, g) = (g^k \mod p) \mod q
\]

(a) Signing

\[
w = f_3(s', q) = (s')^{-1} \mod q
\]
\[
v = f_4(y, q, g, H(M'), w, r') = ((g^{(H(M')w) \mod q} y^{r'w \mod q}) \mod p) \mod q
\]

(b) Verifying
End of Chapter 4/Part2
## The ElGamal Cryptosystem

### Global Public Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>prime number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>$\alpha &lt; q$ and $\alpha$ a primitive root of $q$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key Generation by Alice

- Select private $X_A$
  - $X_A < q - 1$
- Calculate $Y_A$
  - $Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q$
- Public key
  - $PU = \{q, \alpha, Y_A\}$
- Private key
  - $X_A$

### Encryption by Bob with Alice’s Public Key

- Plaintext: $M < q$
- Select random integer $k$
  - $k < q$
- Calculate $K$
  - $K = (Y_A)^k \mod q$
- Calculate $C_1$
  - $C_1 = \alpha^k \mod q$
- Calculate $C_2$
  - $C_2 = KM \mod q$
- Ciphertext:
  - $(C_1, C_2)$

### Decryption by Alice with Alice’s Private Key

- Ciphertext: $(C_1, C_2)$
- Calculate $K$
  - $K = (C_1)^{X_A} \mod q$
- Plaintext:
  - $M = (C_2 K^{-1}) \mod q$